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Using data from England and Wales, we test the hypothesis that legalizing abortion reduces crime. The
timing of changes in crime rates in aggregate data is generally inconsistent with this hypothesis. Using
panel data on recorded crime from 1983 to 2001, we are able to replicate the negative association between
abortion rates and reported crime that J. J. Donohue and S. D. Levitt found for the United States.
However, this association breaks down under the scrutiny of robustness checks and is not present when we
examine data on convictions broken down by age. Overall, we find no clear, consistent relationship
between abortion and crime in England and Wales.
INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s the United States witnessed a large, abrupt drop in crime rates across
virtually all categories and in all regions. Between 1991 and 1999 murder rates fell by
approximately 40% with violent and property crime rates falling by about 30%.1 This
dramatic and unexpected fall in crime led to a scramble by researchers for an
explanation, and, while several factors may have played a role in the reduction of crime
(e.g. increased police presence, strong economic growth, reduction in crack cocaine),
none of them appear capable of explaining the magnitude and timing of the decline
(Levitt 2004).
Donohue and Levitt (2001) (henceforth D&L) offer an explanation. The authors
argue that the legalization of abortion some fifteen to twenty years earlier may be a large
part of the answer. Their hypothesis (discussed in greater detail below) is that legalized
abortion ultimately reduced the birth of children who, had they have been born, would
have been at greater risk of committing crimes when they reached their teenage years.
Several authors (Joyce 2004a, b, 2006; Foote and Goetz 2006; Lott and Whitley 2007)
have subjected the D&L research to re-analysis, focusing on issues concerning both data
and empirical techniques and casting some doubt on the robustness of the original D&L
findings. In turn, Donohue and Levitt have responded (2004, 2006), claiming that the
results of the re-analyses continue to support their hypothesis of a link between abortion
and crime.
The vast majority of work subsequent to D&L (2004) used the United States as a
setting. Given the current state of disagreement about what inferences can be drawn from
the US data, an obvious way forward is to try to test the D&L hypothesis in other
settings. To date, there have been very few attempts at such an exercise. Pop-Eleches
(2006) finds that cohorts born after the abortion restrictions introduced in Romania in
1970 were more likely to commit crimes than those born before the restrictions. However,
he is unable to identify a causal relationship from abortion restrictions, owing to the
possible influence of the transition to capitalism on crime among the affected cohorts.
Sen (2002) examines data from Canada and finds support for the D&L hypothesis with
regard to violent crime for the period 1983–98, but not property crime. One problem with
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Sen’s paper, however, is that much of the variation in abortion access comes after 1988,
when, following a Canadian Supreme Court decision, abortion was made widely
available to women in Canada.2 This being the case, the 1988 law change occurred too
late for it to have an effect on crime in the 1983–98 period he examines. Moreover, Sen’s
paper does not present estimates by single-year-of-age, as found in D&L. Finally, Leigh
and Wolfers (2000), discussing federal data from Australia, noted that a satisfactory
analysis of the question in the Australian context is limited by the apparent lack of
availability of useable crime and abortion data at a more geographically disaggregated
level.
The goal of this study is to test the D&L hypothesis with data from the United
Kingdom. The UK is a particularly useful context in which to examine this issue
for several reasons. In the first place, the United Kingdom legalized abortion in 1968,
some years before most other Western countries; as a result, we have a longer time
period over which to examine any possible impacts on crime. More importantly, a
particular feature of the UK legislation is that there is a statutory requirement for
every abortion to be reported. A consequence of this is that abortion data are of very
high quality. In contrast, the analyses of abortion and crime in the United States
have had to rely on survey data that are incomplete and, in some cases, of questionable
quality. In addition to the abortion data in the UK being complete, much more
detail is available than from most other countries. Abortion data are available broken
down by age of mother, marital status and whether or not the mother had to travel
outside her area of residence to obtain the abortion. This level of detail allows us to test
whether any relationship between abortion and crime is stronger for particular groups,
e.g. abortions performed in local area of residence, teenagers and so on. The final
advantage of the UK context is that institutional factors facilitating abortion have been
subject to change both across regions and over time. This provides a useful source of
exogenous variation in abortion rates with which to identify any abortion–crime
relationship.
The timing of changes in crime rates in aggregate data is generally inconsistent with
this hypothesis, as are comparisons with areas close to England and Wales in which
abortion remained illegal. On the other hand, using panel data on recorded crime in 42
police force areas in England and Wales from 1983 to 2001, and estimating a model quite
similar to D&L’s US model of arrest rates, we do find a negative association between
recorded crime and effective abortion rates. However, this association largely breaks
down under the scrutiny of various robustness checks. Furthermore, we are not able to
find any crime-reducing effects from legal abortion when using convictions data broken
down by age for police force areas over the period 1984–2004, using a similar model to
that of D&L for US conviction rates. These results generally do not provide robust,
statistically significant evidence that legalized abortion has led to reduced crime in the
United Kingdom, a result that stands in contrast to D&L, and which provides the first
reliable evidence on the topic from outside the United States.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides greater detail
of the D&L hypothesis. Section II gives a brief history of abortion policy in the United
Kingdom; it also presents a set of time-series graphs which allow us to offer a visual
display of the timing of abortion legalization and its potential effects on crime some
twenty years hence. Section III follows with our model of crime and discusses the
covariates included and their expected effects on crime rates. Section IV discusses the
estimation approach, describes the data-set and presents our empirical findings.
Concluding thoughts are found in Section V.
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I. THE ABORTION–CRIME RATE LINK
The D&L hypothesis that changes in abortion rates may lead to changes in crime rates
some years later encompasses two propositions: that changes in the abortion rate will
change the size of birth cohorts, and that they will change the composition of the cohort.
Only one of these propositions needs to be valid for changes in abortion rates to have an
effect on crime rates. The first proposition straightforwardly states that if the abortion
rate increases then, ceteris paribus, the birth cohort will be smaller, thereby leaving fewer
individuals to commit crimes later. But it is well known that abortion in the United States
probably had only minimal effects on the number of children born, calling this first
proposition into question. Hence it is the second proposition that D&L stress in their
paper, and this is clearly more controversial. A strong link between abortion and crime
may be revealed if a selection effect is operational.
D&L suggest that abortion may significantly alter the composition of birth cohorts in
a way that leaves relatively fewer potential criminals than if abortion were not legally
available. The reasoning behind this is twofold. First, legalized abortion allows women to
better manage their fertility. That is, if a woman becomes pregnant at an inopportune
time (e.g. during temporary financial difficulties, or while a student), she can terminate
the pregnancy and perhaps bear children later when conditions are more favourable. The
second (and somewhat related) reason why abortion may reduce crime has to do with the
kind of environment into which children would be born if abortion were not available.
Gruber et al. (1999) consider the kind of life that such a ‘marginal child’ might have
experienced if abortion had not been the chosen course of action by the pregnant mother.
Based on research using state-level data from the 1980 US census and US Vital Statistics,
they note that the marginal child would likely have faced multiple hardships, such as
being ‘60% more likely to live in a single parent home, 50% more likely to live in poverty,
45% more likely to be in a household collecting welfare, and 40% more likely to die
during the first year of life’ (p. 265). D&L argue that legalized abortion may have reduced
exposure to such hardships and ultimately caused a reduction in crime some fifteen to
twenty years later. Or, as Levitt and Dubner summarize it in their best-selling book
Freakonomics, ‘Legalized abortion leads to less unwantedness; unwantedness leads to
high crime; legalized abortion, therefore, led to less crime’ (2005, p. 139).
II. ABORTION AND CRIME IN THE UK
The 1967 Abortion Act decriminalized abortion in Great Britain under certain
conditions, the most important being that two doctors had to state in good faith that
continuation of the pregnancy would involve a risk, greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or to any
existing children of the pregnant woman. Many doctors have interpreted this clause as
permitting abortion in any case. Prior to 1967, and following a landmark Court Case in
1938, a small number of abortions were permitted on serious medical grounds.
The Abortion Act came into force in April 1968 and applied to England, Scotland
and Wales, but not to Northern Ireland. The only major amendment to the Act came in
1991, when a formal time limit on abortions of 24 weeks was imposed, with the exception
of certain cases, most particularly when the foetus was thought to be at risk of being born
with physical or mental abnormalities, in which case abortion is permitted at any stage.
During 1969, the first full year in which the Abortion Act was in place, 49,829
abortions were carried out on residents in England and Wales. This increased rapidly to
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over 100,000 by 1972 and then more gradually to about 170,000 in 1989. From this point
onwards, the annual number of abortions on residents has remained relatively stable.
A natural question is whether the 1967 Act actually led to a significant increase in the
total number of abortions. For obvious reasons, illegal abortions are not reported in
official statistics. However, based on maternal deaths and morbidity statistics, Goodhart
(1969, 1972) concludes that between 10,000 and 20,000 illegal abortions were taking place
in the United Kingdom each year, although a proportion of these would have been on
overseas residents.3 Further, Cavadino (1976) presents strong evidence that significant
numbers of illegal abortions continued to take place even after legalization in 1968.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the 1967 Abortion Act led to an increase in the
order of magnitude of abortions being carried out on residents in England and Wales.
Certainly, the likelihood of measurement error from illegal abortion needs to be borne in
mind when interpreting our empirical estimates below. On the other hand, a particularly
relevant feature of the 1967 Act for this paper is the dramatic increase in abortions
provided free of charge on the National Health Service (NHS). Prior to the Abortion
Act, around 3000 abortions were performed in NHS hospitals in the United Kingdom
per year (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 1966), while by 1972 this
figure had risen to around 57,000. Hence there was a major shift in the availability and
monetary cost of abortions for women in socio-economic groups in which crime is most
prevalent.
Data description
The panel data employed covers the 42 police force areas in England and Wales over the
years 1983–2001 for recorded crime and from 1984–2004 for cautions plus guilty (CþG)
data. ‘Recorded crime’ denotes offences that are officially recorded by police authorities
in England and Wales. The Home Office defines a caution as follows: ‘If a person admits
to committing an offence, he may as an alternative to court proceedings be given a
formal police caution, by or on the instructions of a senior police officer.’ Informal or
written warnings, often used in cases of traffic violations or shoplifting, are excluded.
Only indictable offences are recorded. In 1985 the Home Office issued a directive urging
greater use of cautions, and this may have resulted in a trend away from numbers found
guilty towards cautions. The term ‘guilty’ refers to any conviction at a Magistrates’ Court
or Crown Court. In England and Wales all but a few cases are initially heard at a
Magistrates’ Court. If cases are deemed sufficiently severe, they are referred from the
Magistrate’s Court to a higher-level Crown Court. Our data combine all guilty verdicts
(convictions) from magistrates’ and Crown Courts. The cautions and guilty data are
TABLE 1(a)
Percentage Changes in Recorded Crime for England andWales, by Category and
over Sub-periods, 1983–2001
1983–87 1988–92 1993–97 1998–2001 1983–2001
Total 19.1 55.5 –21.8 0 28.9
Property 28.1 57.9 –24.3 –5.1 20.5
Robbery 38.6 98.7 7.2 72.7 484.8
Violent 28.2 24.3 20.1 28.3 99.5
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broken down by single year of age.4 Scotland is excluded because of its separate judicial
system, which generates crime statistics that are not compatible with England and Wales.
The reporting rules for recorded crime changed considerably in 2002, and it is not
possible to calculate a consistent series after this point.5 Aggregate data for the whole of
England and Wales are available from a slightly earlier time period for both data-sets.
Table 1(a) shows a breakdown of recorded crime by type and period, and Table 1(b)
provides summary statistics for recorded crime rates, C þG rates and the covariates; in
Table 1(c) we report summary statistics for the log of total crime and for effective
abortion rates, showing how each of these varies within regions over time, between
regions and also between regions over time.
Figure 1 shows the time-series plot of total, violent and property crime, normalized to
1983, for the period covered in this study. Total and property crime follow almost exactly
the same pattern as that reported for the United States by D&L (see their Figure II, p.
392). Both decreased slightly between 1986 and 1988, increased rapidly up to 1992 and
TABLE 1(b)
Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum
Recorded offence rates
Total 78.58 27.86 28.49 160.87
Property 57.75 21.19 17.39 126.48
Robbery 0.58 0.78 0.03 7.21
Violent 3.63 1.61 1.18 13.03
Cautions plus guilty rates
Ages 15–24 3.64 1.29 0.81 11.10
Covariates
Real average wage (d1983) 195.1 25.38 148.3 327.6
Male unemployment (%) 8.00 3.97 0.81 22.50
Cars 374.55 70.34 206 673
Police 2.16 0.44 1.55 4.64
Children in care 4.98 1.41 2.10 9.90
Note: All reported values refer to annual observations at police force area level for 1983–2001 with the exception
of cautions plus guilty, which are for 1984–2004. All variables are weighted by 1000 population in police force
areas except for real average wage, male unemployment rate and children in care. All covariate values refer to
798 observations over the period 1983–2001.
TABLE 1(c)
Summary ofVariation in KeyVariables
Variable Mean St. dev.
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then experienced a significant decline thereafter. Violent crime, on the other hand,
increased more or less consistently over the whole period, a pattern that contrasts
strongly with that reported for the United States. Figure 2 reports a similar time-series
plot for total number of cautions plus the total number of people found guilty in the
courts that year, expressed as rates per 100,000 population and then as index numbers
with 1977 ¼ 100. We show plots for three age groups: ages 10–15, 16–20, and 21 and
over. These age bands are constructed on the basis of similarity in graph plots by
particular year of age. The plots are not supportive of a link between abortion and crime.








FIGURE 1. Recorded total, violent and property crime rates, England and Wales, 1983–2001










FIGURE 2. Total cautions and guilty by age in England and Wales.
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the plot decreases too late; if abortion plays a part, the decrease should start earlier,
around 1980–2, unless there is a considerable delay in abortion impact. The plots for the
16–20 and 21 and over categories show no downward trend and appear to move up and
down together. For abortion legalization to have an effect, we would predict that one
plot would follow the other downwards.
The significant decreases in murder, violent and property crime in the United States
starting in 1991F18 years after the end of the 1973 Supreme Court ruling abolishing
restrictions on abortionFare a key part of the D&L case that abortion legalization
reduced crime. As abortion in the United Kingdom was legalized five years earlier than in
the United States, if legalization has the causal effect of reducing crime, we would expect
the downward trend in crime to have occurred five years earlier in the former country
than in the latter. The fact that, at least for total and property crime, we observe almost
exactly the same timing in crime trends in the United Kingdom is somewhat problematic
for an abortion–crime link. To illustrate this timing inconsistency, Figure 3 plots violent
and property crime rates in the both countries, each normalized to be 100 in the first full
year of abortion legalization (i.e. 1973 for the United States and 1969 for the United
Kingdom). The horizontal axis shows the number of years since legalization. As seen in
the US series, the turndown in both categories occurs at about the eighteenth or
nineteenth year. The UK series behaves quite differently. Property crime rates show a
slight dip in the nineteenth year, but then continue upward until the turning point in the
twenty-third year. The vertical lines highlight the five-year difference in the local



























FIGURE 3. Violence and property crime rates for the United States and England and Wales since abortion
legalization
Note: Data are indexed to be 100 for the first full year in which abortion was legalized (1973 for the USA,
1969 for England and Wales).
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crime behaves altogether differently, as the plot exhibits a more or less steady rise until
the twenty-fifth year.
There are (at least) three alternative explanations for the observed patterns in crime
trends across the two countries:
(i) Abortion legalization reduced crime in the United States but not the United
Kingdom.
(ii) Abortion did reduce crime in the United Kingdom, but other factors have swamped
the time-series relationship.
(iii) Abortion did not reduce crime either in the United Kingdom or the United States,
and any negative correlation between abortion and crime is spurious.
In the regression analyses below we test the first hypothesis by attempting to correlate
changes in abortion rates within regions of the United Kingdom with changes in
subsequent crime rates. A significant negative correlation between abortion and crime
rates (as found by D&L for the United States) would be evidence against a differential
effect between the two countries.
The fact that abortion remained illegal in states that are geographically and culturally
close to Great Britain provides another useful point of comparison for identifying the
impact of abortion legalisation on crime. In particular, the 1967 Abortion Act did not
apply in Northern Ireland. Similarly, no comparable legislation was passed in the
Republic of Ireland. In Figure 4 we report total recorded crime in four regulatory
regimes between 1983 and 1997, normalizing crime at the start of the period to 100. In
two of these regimes (England/Wales and Scotland) abortion was effectively legalized in
1968, while in the other two (Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) it has
remained illegal throughout the sample period.6 If legalisation of abortion reduces crime,
we might expect that crime in England/Wales and in Scotland decreases relative to the
other two areas from the mid-1980s onwards. In fact, if anything the graph suggests a





















































England & Wales Northern Ireland Scotland Ireland (Eire)
FIGURE 4. Recorded crime rates 1983–1997: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Ireland.
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D&L support their hypothesis that legalization of abortion led to an eventual
reduction in crime, in part by presenting time plots showing that the downturn in crime
in the United States occurred approximately seventeen years after legalization, leading
them to conclude that:
The timing of the break in national crime is consistent with a legalized abortion story. In 1991
the first cohort affected by Roe v. Wade would have been roughly seventeen years old, just
beginning to enter the highest crime adolescent years. (D&L, p. 393)
Similar graphs for England and Wales, including those that draw comparisons with
areas in which abortion has remained illegal, do not yield the same support for an
abortion–crime link. The ability of time-series graphs to identify any crime-reducing
effects of legalized abortion is limited, as other national effects may crowd out the effects
of abortion on crime. Hence a multivariate econometric approach is needed to control
for various changes that might impact on crime, including variations in indicators of
economic performance (real earnings, unemployment), social deprivation and policing.
Construction of effective abortion rates
In contrast to many parts of the United States, health authorities in the United Kingdom
have a statutory requirement to report every legal abortion. As a consequence, a
complete set of data is available from the Department of Health on the number of
abortions performed in each region, broken down by the age, marital status and place of
residence of the mother.
We follow Donohue and Levitt in constructing measures of effective abortion rates,
weighted by the age profile of the criminal population. Abortions can be expected to have
an impact on crime rates only when the children who have been aborted would have been
old enough to commit crimes. Hence we first calculate the annual abortion rate as a
proportion of live births in each police force area. By using lagged values, this provides us
with the abortion ratio in area i for any age j in the current year t. The potential impact of
a high abortion rate for any particular cohort will depend on how prevalent crime is
among that cohort. For this reason, we calculate the effective abortion rate (EARit) as the





where ðArrestsage=ArreststotalÞ is the proportion of crime that is committed by an age
cohort in area i. The weights are derived from data published by the Home Office on
numbers cautioned or found guilty for different crime categories for each area in each
year. The weights we use vary for different crime categories and for each of the 42 police
force areas, but are constant across years.7 If abortion really does have an impact on
crime, then the age distribution of crime will be endogenous to abortion. This would
suggest that we construct the weights using data from a period before abortion could
have had an impact, and this is the procedure followed by Donohue and Levitt.
However, the age distribution of crime may also vary over time for other reasons. In that
case, relying on pre-abortion weights may bias the results. We experiment with three
different sets of crime weights. The first uses data from the early part of the estimation
period, before abortion could have affected the age distribution of crime, to calculate the
weights. The second uses data from the end of the sample, while the third is the mean of
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the first two. In practice, we find that our results are not at all sensitive to the choice of
weights, and all the results reported here are based on the first set, which allows for a
more direct comparison to the D&L results. Figure 5 plots the abortion ratio (abortions
to 1000 live births) from 1968 to 1995, and the effective abortion rate up to 2004.
In our econometric work below, we exploit the quality of the British abortion data by
using alternative measures of effective abortion rates for each of (i) abortions on single
women, (ii) abortions on teenagers and (iii) abortions performed in the health authority
of residence. Regressions shown below use effective abortion rates and an appropriate set
of control variables to identify abortion effects by cross-area variation in effective
abortion rates. Temporal variations will then be captured by inclusion of year dummies.
We can then separate out the effects of abortion from impacts on crime from other
national effects, including cohort impacts on crime.
III. THE MODEL OF CRIME
In order to investigate the possible linkage between recorded crime and abortion we
consider the following model (which bears close resemblance to D&L):
ð2Þ lnðCrimeitÞ ¼ bo þ b1EARit þ XitGþ gi þ vt þ eit;
where Crimeit is the per capita crime rate (total and by sub-category) for police force area
i in year t. The use of area per capita crime rates in all our regressions is appropriate for
the testing of an abortion selection effect on crime. The measure EARit is the effective
abortion rate, as described above. The vector Xit contains a number of covariates
designed to control for various factors that may affect crime rates. The variables gi and vt
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FIGURE 5. Abortion ratio and effective abortion rates across time.
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Covariates
The variables included in vector Xit are motivated by work on the economic analysis of
crime pioneered by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) (see Freeman 1999 for a survey). An
individual faces a choice between legal market work and crime. Crime is chosen when the
difference between the expected return from crime and the expected return from market
work exceeds an exogenous threshold.
In our data-set we have region-level statistics on two variables that capture labour
market opportunities (log average weekly earnings and male unemployment rate) and a
proxy for regional wealth given by the number of cars per capita.8 The net effects of
regional income and unemployment on crime are ambiguous, since increased expected
earnings will raise the demand for crime but will reduce the supply of crime as expected
returns from market work rise relative to expected returns to crime. The use of both
average earnings and unemployment rate as covariates should in principle allow us to
obtain an estimated effect of unemployment on crime through the supply of crime, rather
than through the indirect negative effect via demand for crime (Edmark 2005). Hence we
predict that male unemployment has a positive influence on crime rates.9
Increased wealth raises the demand for crime as more ‘loot’ is available. We have a
useful proxy for regional wealth in the form of number of registered motor vehicles by
private individuals per capita (Witt et al. 1999). An argument can be made for a negative
effect of wealth on crime. As people accumulate more wealth, so they are also likely to
spend more on measures to protect their assets, such as burglar alarms and car alarms.
These devices raise the cost of committing crime and reduce the supply of crime. Hence
the impact of wealth on crime does not occur solely through the demand for crime, and
the sign of impact is an empirical issue.
The supply of crime is predicted to fall as the expected costs of punishment rise. We
have just one measure of cost of punishment, which is the number of police in a police
force area. Increased police strength is predicted to lower crime rates. We endeavour to
reduce the endogeneity bias identified by Levitt (1997), i.e. that police strength may
respond positively to increased crime rates as citizens demand greater police protection,
by using the log of number of police per capita, lagged one period.
A further covariate that we use, not present in D&L, is a measure of social
deprivation: the rate, per 1000 people under 18 years, of children in local authority care.
In England and Wales, children whose parents are deemed unfit to provide for care (e.g.
because of violence or drug abuse) can be placed under the care of local authorities,
either in care homes or with foster parents. The proportion of children in such care is a
proxy for poor social conditions which might be conducive to increased crime since the
stocks of human and social capital will be relatively low in areas with greater social
deprivation.10 Finally, we include the percentage of the regional population aged 15–24
to control for age cohort effects on crime.
IV. ESTIMATION APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Estimation approach
We begin our estimation of equation (3) by utilizing a similar method employed in D&L.
Regressions are performed for total recorded crime rates and separately for three sub-
categories: violence, robbery and property crime.11,12 Fixed-effects regressions are
estimated with controls for year-specific effects, weights based on 1990 population data,
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and allowing for an AR(1) within-panel error structure. Given the possibility of
contemporaneous correlation, panel-corrected standard errors are reported. We then
proceed with various robustness checks; we include regressions excluding London (which
is an outlier in several ways), experiments with various weighting schemes, estimation in
first differences, and regressions using alternative abortion measures.
Empirical results of effective abortion ratio regressions
Table 2 contains the estimation results for the recorded crime data (by total and sub-
categories). Among the covariates, unemployment rates have a positive and significant
effect on total and property crime. The log of police per capita (lagged one period) has a
consistently negative and significant effect on crime in all the regressions. The estimated
coefficient for the log of the average real wage is positive and significant for the robbery
and property categories. The coefficient on children in care is positive and significant for
total crimesFwhich is in line with our hypothesized relationshipFbut is negative and
significant for robbery, which is contrary to our expectations. Our proxy for wealth, the
log of cars per 1000 people, has a negative and significant coefficient for total and
property crimes.
TABLE 2




Total Violent Robbery Property
Effective abortion rate  1.515nn 1.469nnn  4.231nnn  1.305nnn
[0.717] [0.493] [0.691] [0.368]
ln (average real wage) 0.121  0.015 0.712nn 0.217n
[0.142] [0.225] [0.319] [0.130]
Unemployment rate 0.015nnn 0.003  0.011 0.013nnn
[0.005] [0.009] [0.007] [0.005]
ln (cars per 1000 people)  0.132nnn 0.087  0.069  0.166nnn
[0.049] [0.119] [0.129] [0.053]
ln (police per capita (t 1))  0.430nnn  0.407n  0.455nn  0.396nnn
[0.145] [0.218] [0.197] [0.112]
Children in care (4 yr moving avg.) 0.016n 0.012  0.047nnn 0.012
[0.009] [0.016] [0.017] [0.010]
% Population aged 15–24 0.0186 0.0112 0.0368 0.0338
[0.0254] [0.0289] [0.0358] [0.0219]
Constant  2.873nnn  6.409nnn  11.107nnn  3.603nnn
[0.916] [1.583] [1.968] [0.811]
Observations 798 798 798 798
Number of areas 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.995 0.997 0.998 0.995
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors in brackets. Dependent variables are measured as the natural logs of the
per capita rate. All regressions include year and area dummies and are estimated assuming a within-panel AR(1)
error structure.
nSignificant at 10%; nnsignificant at 5%; nnnsignificant at 1%.
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Effective abortion rates are associated with significantly lower recorded rates of total
crime and of robberies and property crime. Abortion, however, is positively and
significantly associated with the violent crime rate. Focusing on total recorded crimes,
our estimates imply that the increase in effective abortion rates from 0 to the mean value
at the end of the sample period ( ¼ 0.161 for total crime) has led to a reduction in total
crime of about 24.4%. This result appears to contradict the impression of a lack of
correlation between abortion and crime given by the time-series plots for England and
Wales in Figure 2. However, taken alone, these figures would suggest that the impact of
abortion on crime in England and Wales is much greater than that found by D&L in the
United States. Given that abortion rates in the England and Wales have historically been
a little lower than in those for the United States, the magnitude of the coefficients is
somewhat implausible. For this reason, we next investigate the sensitivity of this result to
the various robustness checks.
Table 3 reports results from a series of robustness checks. We begin with two checks
also employed by D&L. First, we estimate our total recorded crime regression without
the covariates. The results, provided in the first column of Table 3, show that the
estimated coefficient for the effective abortion rate is now smaller (in absolute terms)
than before and is no longer statistically significant. Second, in an effort to reduce the
possibility of omitted variables bias, we re-estimate our total crime regression and include
regional dummies interacted with year dummies. The regression results, shown in column
(2) of Table 3, provide a slightly larger coefficient for abortion (in absolute terms), but
little change otherwise.
Our next checks attempt to examine the impact of migration and immigration. Some
people who are exposed to abortion in one area may have moved to another area when
crime rates were being measured. Similarly, some people committing crime will have been
born in another country entirely. Inevitably this introduces measurement error into the
regressions and may bias the results. Some data on national and international migration
are published by the Office of National Statistics, although these are not available on a
consistent basis throughout our sample. However, the data do make clear that the
problem is much more significant for London, which is characterized by an extremely
mobile population relative to other areas. Hence our robustness experiment is to exclude
London. A further feature of London is that its population is approximately four times
larger than the next most populous police force authority. In the context of regressions
weighted by population, London may have an unrepresentative influence on regression
results. For this reason, our next experiment was to conduct regressions on unweighted
data.13 The results of these tests are shown in columns (3)–(5) in Table 3. In each case, the
coefficient for the effective abortion rate is not statistically significant while the
coefficients for the covariates are not substantially different from those reported for total
recorded crime in Table 2.
The next robustness checks are to estimate the model using abortions to single
women and to teenagers. To the extent that crime is relatively more prevalent among
offspring of these groups, one would expect any correlation between abortion and crime
to be strongest in these regressions. These are followed by a regression that uses an
effective abortion rate, computed for abortions performed in the health authority of the
woman’s residence. Lastly, as Wooldridge (2002) notes, the first-difference estimator will
be more efficient than the fixed-effects estimator in the context of serial correlation;
consequently our final robustness check reports estimates using first differences.14
The results of these robustness checks, presented in columns (6)–(9) of Table 3,
are remarkably consistent. The covariates display a steady pattern, with coefficients
2008] THE ABORTION–CRIME LINK 13
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on unemployment being positive and significant in all regressions, whereas coefficients
on cars and police are negative and significant in virtually all regressions (though
the coefficient on police loses significance in the regression with the area–year
interactions). Children in care shows a positive and significant coefficient for the
‘single women’, ‘teenage’ and ‘home’ regressions which lends support to our hypothesis
that, in areas where social conditions are worse, crime rates tend to be higher, all
else equal.
Of greatest interest for all the robustness checks shown in Table 3, however, is that in
all cases (other than the regression regional dummies–year interactions) the estimated
coefficient on the effective abortion rate is generally lower in magnitude than before,
varies in sign, and is never statistically significant.
Results from area–year–age regressions
We now turn to results of crime rate regressions using the cautions-plus-guilty data.
These data are organized by single year of age for the ages 15–24.15 As in D&L, we use
the actual abortion rate rather than the ‘effective’ abortion rate used for the recorded
crimes. Fixed-effects regressions for total crimes are reported, followed by a series of
robustness checks. The use of the age-related data is important for at least two reasons.
First, these data allow nationwide variation in access to abortion (in particular the
introduction of legal abortion in 1968) to identify the abortion–crime relationship, while
still controlling for time and regional fixed effects. So, for example, if legalized abortion
first affected births in 1969, we would expect crime among 20-year-olds to decrease in
1989 relative to older age groups. Second, the use of age-related data enables us to
control for effects that are specific to a police force area in a particular year and for
effects that are specific to particular age groups in each police force area. The advantage
of using area–year regressions based upon data on cautions and convictions is that they
allow for explicit controls for omitted area–year factors (the yit terms) that seem to be
biasing the effective abortion ratio regressions.
Two of the ongoing points of contention for the D&L by-age regressions have to do
with appropriate controls for state–year effects and the appropriate computation of
standard errors. Foote and Goetz (2006) note that, owing to a programming error, D&L
mistakenly omitted controls for state–year effects and, as a result, ‘cross-state variation
contaminates [D&L’s] final test’ (p. 16). Furthermore, D&L estimate their by-age
regressions with a clustering by year-of birth and state. However, as pointed out in
Bertrand et al. (2004) and emphasized in both the papers by Foote and Goetz (2006) and
Joyce (2006), computing standard errors by clustering too narrowly places ‘unrealistic
restrictions on the correlation or residuals within states and over time’ (Joyce 2006, p. 5).
Both Foote and Goetz (2006) and Joyce (2006) advocate clustering at a broader level,
namely by state. In order to deal with these issues in our by-age estimates for the C þG
data, we included police force area–year dummies, and we compute robust standard
errors by clustering on police force areas.
Empirical results for cautions plus guilty
Using data on cautions and guilty verdicts, we estimate the following equation:
ð3Þ ln ðArrestsi;t;ageÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 abortion ratioi;birthyear þ XitGþ gi;age þ lageband;t þ yit þ eit:
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Table 4 presents the by-single-year-of-age regression results for the cautions-plus-
guilty data, including robustness checks. Each regression includes the same set of
covariates used in the recorded crime regressions, with the additions of age-covariate
interactions to allow for differential impacts of the covariates for each age group. That is,
we include the interaction of each covariate with the age dummy to allow for different
impacts of covariates for different age groups. Hence these interaction terms are not
conflated with the area–year effects. As noted earlier, these are fixed-effects regressions
that include both area–year and area–age controls and compute robust standard errors
by clustering on area. To control for national changes in the way that crime among
different age groups is treated (as suggested, for example, by the series in Figure 3), we
divide the sample into three age-bands (15–17, 18–20 and 21–24) and include interaction
terms between these age bands and each year.16 Including these controls still allows
nationwide changes to abortion provision (most particularly legalization) that are year-
specific to have a differential impact on crime within the three age bands. Note that,
in the context of England and Wales, where legal abortion was allowed at the same time
in every area, including a fixed effect for interactions between years and each single year
of age (rather than age bands) would eliminate entirely the impact of abortion
legalization on crime. In order to save space, only the coefficients for the abortion rate
are reported.17
The results displayed in Table 4 are mixed. For total cautions plus guilty, and for
four of the six robustness checks, the estimated coefficient to the abortion rate is not
different from zero, implying no crime-reducing effect. However, the regressions that
exclude London have positive and significant coefficients. These effects stand in stark
contrast to D&L, and are similar to the results of Lott and Whitley (2007), who find a
direct relationship between abortion and murder rates in the United States. These
authors argue that their direct relationship may perhaps be explained by the work of
Akerlof et al. (1996), who note that legalized abortion and improved access to
TABLE 4
Fixed-Effects Regressions forTotal Cautions plus Guilty, England andWales, for











Abortion rate 0.226 0.992nnn 0.425 0.781nnn 0.043 0.992 0.465
[0.193] [0.308] [0.329] [0.257] [0.279] [1.015] [0.364]
Observations 8820 8610 8820 8610 8820 8400 8820
No. of area–age
groups
420 410 420 420 420 420 420
R-squared 0.927 0.935 0.919 0.921 0.927 0.929 0.928
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by area, in brackets. Dependent variables are measured as the natural
logs of the per capita rate.
All regressions include year dummies, year–area interaction effects, area–age interation effects, a complete set of
covariates and interactions of covariates with age dummies. Regressions are weighted using 1990 population
values.
nSignificant at 10%; nnsignificant at 5%; nnnsignificant at 1%.
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contraception may have led to greater out-of-wedlock births. If true, and if children of
out-of-wedlock births have a greater propensity to a life of crime as they grow older, then
a positive relationship between abortion and subsequent crime may be observed.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The claims in Donohue and Levitt (2001) that the legalization of abortion in the
United States in the 1970s led to a subsequent reduction in crime in the 1990s caused a
significant stir among economists, criminologists and others. The goal of the present
paper was to put the D&L hypothesis to test in a different environment, namely the
United Kingdom.
Based on the above analysis, we are unable to say that abortion legalization in the
United Kingdom significantly reduced crime in England and Wales some twenty years
thereafter. We come to this conclusion by first noting, as we did earlier, that total
recorded crime in the United Kingdom began to decrease at about the same time as in the
United States, despite the fact that abortion legalization occurred here about five years
earlier. Thus, we have a discrepancy in the timing of the potential effect of abortion on
crime between the United States and the United Kingdom. Further, crime in England
and Wales did not decrease relative to areas in which abortion remained illegal
throughout the time period. On the other hand, regression models linking effective
abortion rates in the United Kingdom and subsequent recorded crime suggest the same
negative and significant correlation between the two variables (at least for total recorded
crime and some sub-categories) as that reported for the United States by D&L. However,
this negative association breaks down when we consider various robustness checks.
Furthermore, when using our C þG data, our results are mixed and indicate either no
relationship between abortion and subsequent crime, or a positive one in cases where
London is excluded from the analysisFthese latter results being opposite to those results
found in D&L.
We hypothesized above that this pattern of results might be explained in one of two
ways: first, that abortion reduced crime in both the United Kingdom and the United
States but that the timing of the relationship in the United Kingdom is obscured by other
variables; or, second, that abortion did not reduce crime in either the United Kingdom or
the United States and that the negative correlation observed in the regressions was a
spurious one. It is this latter possibility that concerns us greatly. In particular, one of the
key weaknesses that we believe exists not only in the D&L paper, but in other papers
attempting to link abortion rates to crime rates some fifteen to twenty years hence is the
distinct likelihood that abortion is endogenous to crime, owing to omitted variables bias.
For example, we can consider factors such as education and income levels of women,
which may affect the fertility decisions of women and, in particular, the likelihood that
an unwanted pregnancy will be terminated. According to research by Finer and Henshaw
(2006) on unintended pregnancy in the United States in 2001, women below the poverty
level had an abortion ratio (relative to unintended births) of 0.93, whereas the figure for
women with income more than twice the poverty level was 1.64. As for education, women
with less than high school education had an abortion ratio of 0.90, while women who
were college graduates had an abortion ratio of 1.60. To the extent that these same
measuresFincome and educationFwould have an effect on the human capital
endowment of their children, and ultimately the propensity for these children to engage
in criminal activity, the exclusion of such measures would bias the estimated coefficient to
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abortion. Future research might usefully explore this issue further by attempting to
identify explicitly unobservable variables that may explain both variation in abortion
rates and variation in subsequent crime.
In any case, puzzles remain that need explanation. In particular, to be able to
discount the abortion–crime link satisfactorily, researchers would need to identify more
fully the social phenomenon that led to reductions in at least some crime categories in the
early 1990s both in the United Kingdom and the United States. The fragility of the
results in this paper serve to emphasize the difficulty researchers have in identifying
causal effects of social change such as abortion legalization on crime rates some years
hence, particularly given the myriad of other social changes occurring over the same time,
which may dilute any effect. In general, we believe that an examination of alternative
regulatory environments is a fruitful direction for researchers who want to improve our
understanding of the link between abortion and crime.
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Crime variables
All crime data used were obtained from the Home Office as summarized annually in Criminal
Statistics, Supplementary Tables, Volume 3, and refer to 42 police force areas in England and
Wales. Figures for the two London police force areas, the City of London and Metropolitan Police,
were combined.
Abortion data
All data on abortion are taken from the Abortion Statistics annual reference volumes published by
the Office for National Statistics.
Police strength
Numbers of police officers in each police force area were obtained from Police Officer Strength
England and Wales, House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/28, 2001.
Population
Population numbers for police force areas were derived by adding county data taken from Census
of Population 2001.
Real average earnings
Average earnings are weekly earnings for all full-time adult male workers as given in New Earnings
Survey, published annually. The reported employment weights from the survey were used to
combine county data into police force areas. The price deflator used in all items is the retail price
index, base year 1987, from Office of National Statistics.
Male unemployment rate
This series was obtained from NOMIS, the National On-line Manpower Information Service,
based at the University of Durham. The denominator is the male labour force actively seeking
work. Labour force weights are used to aggregate counties into police force areas.
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Cars
Numbers of car registrations are as collected by the UK Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and
reported in annual editions of Regional Trends. Figures are weighted by 1000 population.
Children in care
This is the number of children under 18 in local authority care per 1000 resident population under
18. Figures were obtained from Regional Trends. Population weights were used to combine counties
into police force areas.
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NOTES
1. Donohue and Levitt (2001, p.392).
2. According to Sen (2002, p. 5), abortion was technically legal as early as 1969, but women faced
significant obstacles. He notes that abortion remained a crime, but could be allowed under special
permission if a committee of three doctors at a hospital determined that by not having an abortion the
pregnant mother’s life or health would be in danger.
3. Other authors suggest that as many as 250,000 illegal abortions took place in the United Kingdom each
year. However, higher estimates such as this were usually proposed by organizations campaigning for
abortion legalization (e.g. the Birth Control Trust in 1988) and their basis is difficult to establish. As
Greenwood and Young (1976) argue, ‘Experience shows that wherever legislation has become more
permissive there has been an initial & sustained rise in the number of legal abortions. Easier access and
acceptance of abortion enables many women who would not have risked the back street market to
terminate their pregnancies’ (p. 31).
4. Some data on victim reports of crime are available from the British Crime Victim Survey, but these are
not available either as a panel or on a consistent annual basis. Although there are concerns about the
rigour and accuracy with which reported crime offences are compiled (Macdonald 2002) we have no
other source of data appropriate to panel data modelling and close enough to the approach taken by
D&L. We assume therefore that any errors in crime reporting do not produce biases in our estimated
coefficients and standard errors. Any deviations in crime reporting across police forces or over time will
then be picked up in area and year fixed effects. As the C þ G data-set is broken down by single year of
age, we are able to include fixed effects for each area–year combination in these regressions, and this
provides an even more robust control for deviations in annual reporting.
5. The counting rules for recorded crime also changed in 1998. However, the Home Office provides
information on how each crime category in each police force authority is affected by the change, and
this enabled us to calculate consistent series up to 2001.
6. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the comparison with Northern Ireland. Data
limitations meant that a more formal difference-in-difference analysis of the control and intervention
states was not possible. The graphs end in 1997, as the recording system for Northern Ireland changed
considerably after that time.
7. We aggregate the abortion data up to the police force area, the only level at which crime data are
available. The police force area boundaries have not changed since 1974. The abortion data are
sufficiently disaggregated to allow us to match the 1974 boundaries. For five police force areas the
matching is not perfect for data before 1974. In each of these cases only a small part of the police force
area was affected. The results reported are robust to exclusion of these areas.
8. See the Appendix for detailed variable descriptions and sources.
9. The use of male unemployment rates is due partly to greater consistency of definition and coverage over
time for men and to the fact that the overwhelming majority of crimes are committed by (young) men;
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crime rates are then likely to respond more to male unemployment rates than total unemployment rates.
The unemployment rate is not logged in our estimations.
10. Two covariates were experimented with but dropped due to lack of significant coefficients. These were
the ratio of 75th to 25th percentile weekly earnings (highly correlated with average earnings) and the
proportion of school-leavers having no formal qualifications to proxy low levels of human capital.
11. Violence includes sex crimes. Property is equal to theft plus burglary. Total crime includes the three sub-
categories plus fraud and damage crimes.
12. We also estimated a dynamic version of equation (3) with a lagged-dependent variable using the method
set out in Arellano and Bond (1991). The results, however, produced few significant regressors other
than the lagged dependent variable.
13. We also experimented with the use of an alternative set of weightings based on population stability
within each area, estimated from the ONS migration and immigration data. In common with the other
robustness experiments, these results also reduce the size of the abortion coefficient and render it
insignificant.
14. In addition, results from a panel unit root test by Levin et al. (2002) indicated possible non-stationarity
for the recorded violence and sex crime variables. Thus, first-difference estimation may alleviate this
problem.
15. The numbers cautioned or guilty fall very rapidly below the age of 15, and hence we follow D&L and
other authors in excluding these younger age groups.
16. A particular issue in this regard is juvenile crime, which is covered by a different system from crime by
adults. Before 1992 juveniles were defined as those aged under 18. After this point, the definition
changes to those under 17 years of age. We consequently included a dummy variable for juveniles to
control for this change. D&L broke down their area–age–year regressions into violent crime and
property crime. This is not possible for England and Wales, as some area–year–age cells have zero
entries for violent crime, particularly for juveniles in rural areas.
17. A complete set of estimated covariate coefficients is available from the authors.
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